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”We Are the People.” Refugee-’Crisis,’ and the 
Drag-Effects of Social Habitus in German Society
Inken Rommel ∗ 
Abstract: »’Wir sind das Volk.’ Flüchtlingskrise und Nachhinkeffekte beim so-
zialen Habitus in der deutschen Gesellschaft«. In Germany, like in other Euro-
pean countries, one can observe the recent rise of right wing movements, re-
ferred to by some authors as the New Right (Bruns, Glösel and Strobel 2016). 
During the last years those tendencies were able to create and establish closed 
pictures of national identities, and promote these quite successfully through 
populist discourses (Speit 2016, 314). Since the so called ‘Refugee-crisis,’ they 
gained even more approval throughout German society and established the 
‘Muslim’ as contrary to German habitus. On the contrary there are also civic 
movements that show explicit solidarity with refugees and offer their help to the 
newcomers, which was labelled as ‘welcome-culture.’ Since this polarisation of 
attitudes towards refugees is so obvious, the question that is addressed in this 
article concerns the motives and structural circumstances of this division of ori-
entations throughout German society, and hints at questions of identity and 
habitus. 
Keywords: Refugee-crisis, drag-effect of social habitus, New Right, Welcome-
culture, Germany. 
1.   Introduction 
In the consequences of war and economic crisis, millions of refugees were on 
their way to Europe and almost one million to Germany in 2015. From that 
point onwards, the discourse surrounding migration and asylum became central 
in political and public controversy. Earlier influential people like Thilo Sar-
razin, according to Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations, established a picture of 
the Muslim as the cultural enemy to western societies (Rommel 2016), and 
most refugees who came to Germany are Muslims. Since then the debate heat-
ed up on the topic of refugee relief. Are we, as a rich industrial country, com-
mitted to refugee relief (moral, ethical side, economic side)? To what extent are 
we supposed to help? What kind of risks can occur in the consequence of the 
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great amount of refugees who came (under partially chaotic circumstances) to 
Germany. 
 Are we morally and accordingly ethically obliged to help out and integrate 
these refugees, or are we from the other perspective incredibly naive to think 
that those people, who are mainly culturally different, as it is emphasised on 
the nationalistic side of the figuration, are not going to exploit this kind of help 
for their own interests. Alongside these questions, a polarisation within German 
society took place, which might be only a symptom of deeper changes within 
society. 
In 2016 it becomes particularly clear that the social center represents opinions 
which regard equivalence as a fundamental obstacle to democracy, as well as 
anti-human attitudes, which put these foundations in question and endanger 
them. (Zick and Küpper 2016, 15, translation I. R.) 
The asylum seekers who arrived in 2015 seem to trigger extreme fears among 
great parts of German society (Zick 2016, 205); even though scientific repre-
sentatives point out that the refugees present are neither an economic nor a 
demographic problem for Germany. Quite the opposite: they bring new dynam-
ics and opportunities into an ageing population with little economic growth.1 
According to that, the threat a significant part of German society is experi-
encing, is not based on material goods or direct concurrence but on issues of 
“identity.” The idea that foreign people can become German causes discomfort 
for some people (Treibel 2015, 47). The fear of “foreign domination” or of the 
allegedly “Islamisation” seem to be the main aspects of the right wing protest 
we are currently experiencing in a lot of European countries. 
Two main opposing factions have developed out of this discourse around the 
so called “refugee-crisis” in Germany (Münkler and Münkler 2016, 186-7). On 
the one hand, there is a great welcome-attitude towards the refugees; thousands 
of civilians helped to supply them with food, clothes, bureaucratic help, lan-
guage courses, welcomed them at the train stations and more. On the other 
hand there is a growing part of German society which experiences the influx of 
refugees as a big threat and rally to right wing movements (Vorländer, Herold 
and Schället 2016; Kellershohn and Kastrup 2016; Bruns, Glösel and Strobel 
2016; Speit 2016). 
In this article, I would like to describe both groups and their beliefs and 
claims with a focus on the right wing side. According to this, I will use Norbert 
Elias’s theoretical frame of reference to find some explanations for the devel-
opment of strong right wing movements in Germany. In particular, the concept 
of “drag-effect of habitus” from Norbert Elias which refers to the fact that an 
asynchrony of the individual habitus and societal power-structures can emerge; 
social habitus is described by Elias as “habits and ways of thinking, feeling and 
                                                             
1  “The inflow of refugees is an economic stimulus for Germany” (Welt 2015, translation I. R.). 
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acting, which are bounded to the social group of an individual” (Elias 2001, 
183). This phenomenon emerges particularly in times of shifting power-
structures, as we can observe today within the European integration process – 
where more and more power-resources from the national state overflow to the 
super-national “integration unit” European Union. 
My hypothesis is that this phenomenon of drag effects, can to a certain ex-
tent explain the extensive rise of right populist parties and movements in Ger-
many and other European countries.  
According to this, my hypothesis is that the “New Right” in Germany repre-
sents the people who suffer from this drag-effect of habitus as described by 
Elias. They personalise and ‘culturise’ (blaming Muslims, asylum seekers, the 
elites) developments which are caused by worldwide interdependencies, and 
reject the increasing interconnections in international spheres – since this rejec-
tion is without any perspective2 of success, they react even more aggressively 
and desperately in addressing the allegedly guilty ones.3 
Picking up earlier discourses, ‘the Muslim’4 constitutes a suitable scapegoat 
for insecure right-wingers. According to this, I would postulate that these drag-
effects of habitus are intensified by the financial crisis, which enhanced the 
insecurity about future wealth (Sommer 2010; Marg 2014) for large portions of 
European societies. Also the following politic of austerity increased the envy 
and mistrust between the countries. National governments used these quarrels 
for their domestic political interests and to stoke mistrust between the popula-
tions. The conflict between Germany and Greece, where the Germans regarded 
the Greeks as lazy, and the Greeks saw the Germans as Nazis, can be an exam-
ple for this. 
2. Rise of Right Movements in Germany – the “New 
Right” 
Right wing populism has reestablished itself during the last years in Germany. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, parties such as the NPD who have represented right 
                                                             
2  “Globalization is inherent in modernity” (Hall 1990, 209). 
3  These reactions do not only show themselves in a raw language and a shift to the right in 
the discourse but also in an increasing numbers of violent incidents, as the latest numbers 
on attacks on refugees and their housings show (<http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/ 
zeitgeschehen/2016-09/rechtsextremismus-gewalt-anstieg-deutschland-neonazis-fremden 
feindlichkeit-fluechtlinge>, Accessed November 15, 2017). 
4  When Thilo Sarrazin published his book “Germany does away with itself” in 2010, where he 
characterises Muslims in Germany as a less intelligent and dangerous group which is cultur-
ally not compatible with German merits, a debate around the cultural identity arose in 
Germany (Rommel 2016; Bruns et al. 2016, 39). Speit also identifies Sloterdijk as relevant 
figure in this discourse (Speit 2016, 321). 
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politics in Germany for a long time, were a minor phenomenon only accepted 
by a small percentage of German people (Speit 2016, 317). 
Noticeable is that not only poorly educated marginalised milieus support the 
New Right. The “New Right” in Germany can rely on much greater support 
throughout the whole of society, as the latest surveys show (Decker, Kiess and 
Bähler 2016; Bruns, Glöseö and Strobel 2016; Speit 2016). They emphasise the 
hypothesis that the bourgeois milieus play a great role in the establishment of 
right, nationalistic, and racist (‘völkisch’) ideas throughout Germany. Follow-
ing Norbert Elias in his ‘Studies on the Germans,’ we also find the idea that 
bourgeois milieus, which were habitually bounded to militaristic merits, have 
been a supportive reference to the authoritarian ideas which became dominant 
in the 1930s (Elias 2005, 76 ff.). 
The authors Bruns, Stroble and Glösel show that the “Conservative Revolu-
tion”5 is an important frame of reference for the “New Right” and also an ideo-
logical bridge to other right currents (2016, 43-6). In the same way there is a 
differentiation throughout the population, the right scene is also divided into 
different currents. While for example Bruns et al. (2016) as well as Speit 
(2016) reveal the interconnections between the right currents, one can 
acknowledge the range of right orientations in the bourgeois party AfD, the 
young trendy Identitarian movement (Hafeneger 2014, 5) and Pegida, which is 
characterised by their scepticism against what they call “the elites” (Vorländer, 
Herold and Schäller 2016). 
There are connections between right-wingers throughout Europe, as for ex-
ample the meeting of Marine Le Pen and Frauke Petry in 2016 demonstrates.6 
To summarise, there are growing right wing movements, which are ideolog-
ically supported by significant parts of German middle class and bourgeois 
milieus. Prominent intellectuals like Sarrazin and Sloterdijk paved the way for 
this shift to the right (Bruns, Glösel and Strobel 2016, 39; Speit 2016, 319; 
Rommel 2016). Even though these movements are bound to national interests, 
there are interconnections between right movements and parties throughout 
Europe. They share the idea of a “conservative revolution” against so-called 
“Gutmenschen” (“good humans”) and liberal elites (Bruns, Glösel and Strobel 
2016). 
We understand the ‘new rights’ as a summary of all those groups which form 
a right-wing discourse on 1968 and are positive for the ideas and / or persons 
                                                             
5  Even though there is also criticism on the term of “Conservative Revolution,” since their 
alleged representatives are quite incoherent, they were able to identify key aspects of a 
mentality which they share: heroism, readiness to make sacrifices, readiness to use violence 
to follow one’s interests, the claim for a “male” society, rejecting everything which is per-
ceived as “feminine,” such as peace, democracy, and pacifism (Bruns, Glösel and Strobel 
2016, 42-6). 
6 <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-10/afd-frauke-petry-marine-le-pen-front- 
national-treffen> (Accessed November 15, 2017). 
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of the ‘Conservative Revolution’. […] The ‘New Right’ thus consists both of 
a radicalized, value-conserving bourgeoisie and of modern right-wing extrem-
ism. (Bruns, Glösel and Strobel 2016, 28-9, translation I. R.) 
In the following, I am going to characterise three important currents of the 
“New Right” in Germany, with specific reference to the AfD, Pegida and 
“Identitarian movement.” 
2.1  AfD – Alternative for Germany 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis and the bank crisis and European debt 
crisis of 2008/2009, the “AfD” – Alternative for Germany – appeared on the 
political stage in 2013. Pivotal for their claims was the preservation of Europe-
an banks during the crisis over German taxes (different perspectives are possi-
ble since a lot of creditors were German investors). In this period of the party 
formation there was already the tendency of criticising global interdependen-
cies and European obligations as an economic threat for Germany – reorienta-
tion towards national interest was their credo from the beginning (Friedrich 
2015, 28 ff.). In the course of the events which were labelled the “refugee-
crisis” in the German discourse, in 2015, their contextual focus shifted from 
primarily economic themes, such as the abolition of the Euro in favour of na-
tional currencies, to more identity-centred themes like “German merits” and 
“core culture” which, from their point of view is being threatened by refugees 
coming to Germany. 
Their main claims and viewpoints are to be read in their party programme 
from 2016. They believe in and point out the allegedly “distinctive entity” of 
the “cultural nation” of Germany and their responsibility in preserving this 
entity (AfD 2016, 32-3). Important to them is the claim for German “core cul-
ture,” instead of a politically supported multiculturalism, while multicultural-
ism is in turn interpreted as a great threat. AfD representatives fear the relativi-
sation of German merits as the consequence of multicultural offers of construal. 
The German language represents a main object of German identity to them 
(AfD 2016, 32). “Politically correct” language and gender mainstreaming, 
which gained more importance during recent years in the German discourse, 
are rejected by the AfD (AfD 2016, 33). 
Another important aspect of their worldview is the claim for a positive 
German culture of remembrance in opposition to the “shame culture of remem-
brance,” as perceived by Höcke for example (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2017). Even 
though Höcke is perceived as radical within his party, one can find the inten-
tion to create a positive remembrance culture in the party programme (AfD 
2016, 33) – his speech can be seen as paradigmatic for a group of people who 
seem to suffer from a lack of symbolic national pride and perceive this as an 
emotional pain and shame. The concept of the “logic of emotions” (Elias and 
Scottson 1993, 18) which I will introduce later in this paper, might help to 
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explain this kind of personal emotional shame, which nation-orientated people 
feel, considering the “national history of shame” as Höcke calls it. They are 
aware of the loss of political and financial power of the institutional level of 
national states in favour of the institutional level of a supranational union like 
the EU. 
“Islam does not belong to Germany” (AfD 2016, 44), is one of their most 
prominent statements. In great parts of German discourse, they refer to ‘Islam’ 
as an essential entity (Rommel 2016) and not as a diverse frame of reference 
which can be more or less important to the individual identity, as for example 
Pickel and Yendell show in their survey in 2016. They found that a great per-
centage of the people who are classified as ‘Muslims’ think of themselves as 
not, or not very religious. Labelling processes take place, which address Ger-
mans with migration backgrounds and refugees as one category – Muslim 
(Pickel and Yendell 2016, 275). 
Another claim is that Germany is no “immigration country” (AfD 2016, 42) 
– the old credo of former German governments. It negates and disguises the 
several key roles immigration has played for Germany in the last decades 
(Bade 1994, 2013), and can also be seen as a symbolic degradation of immi-
grants already living in Germany – telling them you are not in; you do not 
belong in our country. They try to create a closed German identity, and present 
themselves as representatives of German culture which constitutes a usurpation 
of all ethnic Germans, and an exclusion of every one who is, from their point of 
view, not part of this culture (Kastrup 2016, 223). 
About the AfD programme:  
It is necessarily exclusive, is directed against all strangers alike (even if prag-
matic political considerations allow “exceptions”) and also against all ‘Ger-
mans’ who are not willing to identify themselves with predefined ‘values and 
ideas.’ (Bruns, Glösel and Strobel 2016, 26, translation I. R.)  
The AfD supporters position themselves explicitly for liberalism of trade, but 
reject the mobility of migrants and legitimate this position by insisting on eth-
nic affiliation and an alleged incompatibility between “German” and “Muslim” 
“merits.” Since many asylum seekers who are currently coming to Germany are 
Muslims, they are discriminated against by AfD supporters for their political 
status as well as their “culture.” They also claim for austerity regarding the 
fundamental Right for Asylum (AfD 2016, 44). 
In their rhetoric (AfD 2016), one can observe a well-known demagogic 
strategy of emphasising coherence on the inside and insuperable differences to 
the outside of their alleged group (Elias and Scotson 1993, 39). 
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2.2 Pegida – Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the 
Occident 
The development and the constitution of the right wing movement Pegida has 
been precisely analysed by Vorländer, Herold and Schäller (2016). Pegida is a 
movement which arose in October 2014. They meet every Monday in Dresden 
to protest against the politics concerning refugees, the ‘establishment,’ and the 
press. Although Pegida is mainly an East German phenomenon, there were 
attempts to start these demonstrations in West German cities but they were not 
as successful as in eastern parts of Germany. In Dresden, where Pegida was 
initiated, from 350 to 25,000 people attended these demonstrations (Vorländer, 
Herold and Schäller 2016, 8). Even though Pegida and their attendees are less 
coherent compared to the other right currents, one can identify their overall 
positions as follows: 
They address criticism to the political and social establishment. Similar to 
the AfD they believe German culture as being suppressed and infiltrated by 
Muslims (Vorländer, Herold and Schäller 2016, 32-3). They also aim to protect 
German language, and a certain idea of German culture is paramount to them. 
Similar to the AfD they reject gender mainstreaming and politically correct 
language, which they express with labels such as “terror of minorities” or “dic-
tatorship of sentiments” (Vorländer, Herold and Schäller 2016, 34). Migration 
should only be possible if it suits German interests, and family politics must be 
in the focus of the government to solve demographic problems. The European 
Union should be a compound of sovereign national states instead of ongoing 
integration (Vorländer, Herold and Schäller 2016, 36). According to these 
claims, Chancellor Angela Merkel is perceived as a traitor – as she made the 
decision to not close the borders when thousands of refugees were stuck at the 
Hungarian border in late summer of 2015 – she is being blamed by the Pegida 
protesters to make the alleged subversion of Germany by Muslims possible. 
This position has been illustrated through posters during the demonstrations, 
which show Merkel wearing a headscarf. Pegida protestors are chanting “We 
are the people” – this slogan referring to earlier events, when inhabitants of the 
DDR demonstrated against the socialist regime, claiming for democratic partic-
ipation. This was a clever agitation since the Pegida- demonstrators point out 
their democratic rights against a regime of political correctness that from their 
point of view creates “bans of thinking and speaking” – with this image they 
try to cover their own exclusive and authoritarian orientations. 
This slogan also represents the notion of a coherent “people” (‘Volk’) with a 
“will of the people” and it implies the accusation of German politicians to act 
not in favour of the Germans, but of international elites and Muslims. They 
proclaim themselves as the mouthpiece for the “anxious and disaffected bour-
geois” (Vorländer, Herold and Schäller 201, 31). 
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This hints to the overall claim that the national state is the only legitimate 
form of representation to them. The ongoing political integration is perceived 
as a big threat regarding orientation and identity. “Our country, our merits” 
(Vorländer, Herold and Schäller 2016, 94) is another slogan. Even so, they call 
themselves patriotic Europeans that represent nationalistic orientations. 
The New Right proclaim that the re-orientation of the national state is a way 
of gaining back control over a confusing internationalised world. This seems to 
be an attractive proposal for identity, which has become politically endangered 
during globalised, post-modern developments (Hall 1990, 186). 
2.3  Identitarian Movement 
The Identitarian Movement is a European phenomenon, but in its various cur-
rents very nationalistic and culturalistic. The first gathering was in France in 
2012, the consolidation of a German branch taking place in 2014 (Bruns, Göbel 
and Strobel 2016). 
They are an offshoot of ethnopluralism, which has been described by Stuart 
Hall as a “cultural definition of race” (Hall 1994, 208) and which is based on 
the conviction that there are unvarying collective ethnic groups, which are all 
supposed to preserve their authentic culture and identity. Thus, European col-
lective ethnic groups and their cultural identity are threatened by migrant flows 
and therefore need to be defended. In their opinion, no migration should be 
legal and ethnic coherence is the most important good, which needs to be pre-
served (Hafeneger 2014, 2-3). 
The ideological content of Germany’s identity movement stands in the long 
tradition of modernized extreme rights, which focuses on the appropriation of 
themes regarding cultural hegemony. (Hafeneger 2014, 5, translation I. R.) 
They demand direct democracy through which the “true will of the people” is 
revealed, using democratic freedom of expression to sell their notions of identity 
as “truth.” Followers of the Identitarian Movement stand in the tradition of the 
cultural war concepts, as in the conservative revolution of the Weimar Repub-
lic. Their ideological programme refers to the Nouvelle Droite (Hafeneger 
2014, 3). 
They address established politicians like Angela Merkel with the accusation 
of being part of a big conspiracy, which has the aim of a “massive replace-
ment” of German people in favour of “Muslims.” This idea corresponds with 
the accusation of Pegida that Merkel acts in favour of Muslims instead of her 
own “Volk.” Particularly within the Identitarian Movement, the fear of a “great 
exchange,” in favour of Muslims, is dominant, aiming instead for a closed 
German culture according to their beliefs. European peoples are supposed to be 
“de-mixed.” They perceive themselves as counter movement to the 1968s 
movement and want to establish a new conservative Zeitgeist. They share con-
nections to other New Right “culturalised” racist associations such as the Insti-
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tute for State Policy7 which is run by Götz Kubischek, a prominent right intel-
lectual (Hafeneger 2014, 3). 
They address to the Germans the accusation of a “decadent society,” which 
risks the “overall despair” of traditions, merits, and homeland.  
The core of ethno-cultural identity thinking focuses on demarcation and in-
cludes the idea that ethnic groups – so the group construction – their land and 
people, who are characterised by their language and culture are supposed to 
live in a coherent community in their historic place. (Hafeneger 2014, 4, trans-
lation I. R.)  
They subsequently assume a homogenous character and substantiality of peo-
ples. They claim heterosexuality to be an important norm (Bruns, Glösel and 
Strobel 2016, 17). 
They stage themselves as resistance fighters against the Muslims and see 
themselves in the tradition of Charles Martel, with Muslims as historic enemies 
(Bruns, Glösel and Strobel 2016, 16). 
2.4 Common Claims of Right Movements in Germany (AfD, 
Pegida, Identitarian Movement) 
Summarising the statements of these three important currents of the “New 
Right” one can conclude that: 
Representatives of the “New Right” in Germany promote a conservative 
view on gender roles and family life. They aim to preserve a certain idea of 
German culture and language. They insist on a priority to Germany, its people, 
and interests. They share a clear orientation towards the national state and are 
convinced that the national state should be the ruling institution. They support 
traditional family structures to preserve their “ethnic group,” which is imagined 
as coherent and stable. They support the statement that Islam does not belong 
to Germany; Muslims are perceived as cultural enemies trying to take over 
Germany, supported by German elites. The Pegida demonstrators expressed 
these claims through the slogan ‘we are the people,’ which represents the claim 
for elites to concentrate on them and their interests (see Sections 2 to 2.3).  
They conduct a usurpation of all ethnic Germans (Hafeneger 2014, 4) by as-
suming a coherent cultural orientation and a “will of the people” which is sup-
posed to be represented by them. The alleged homogeneity though is an illu-
sion (Treibel 2015, 51); actually, due to its historic formation, Germany and its 
people are very diverse. 
The implicitness of using cultural arguments especially regarding Muslim 
people refers to an earlier discourse in Germany (Rommel 2016). This dis-
course focused on cultural differences as the cause of conflicts and inequality 
                                                             
7  “Institut für Staatspolitik”, located in Schnellroda, Saxony-Anhalt, Germany. 
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between the Muslim and the autochthonous parts of German society (Rommel 
2016, 177). 
In the aftermath of this discourse, a new form of discrimination became 
prominent; different from former racial ideologies not “race” but “culture” is 
perceived as the dividing paradigm to identify others who are rejected from 
belonging to Germany and its culture. One can observe this throughout all 
currents of the right movement. 
The discourse surrounding core culture, initiated by the Interior Minister of 
Germany, exhibits how an essentialised and culturalised view on identity is 
also proclaimed by the so-called “established” parties; the German government 
and the conservative party in particular. Such a culturalised discourse obscures 
the structure and phenomena of inequality (Attia 2016, 181-99; Speit 2016, 
324), which have to do with historical path dependencies – and estimates a 
power-based conflict as a conflict of cultural values (Rommel 2016). 
2.5  Representations of Right Claims in German Society, Numbers 
Some results of profound German surveys on right attitudes and right-wing 
radicalism can illustrate that claims and positions of right-wing populism, 
outlined above, have spread widely in German society. The authors of “Survey 
of the Middle (2016)” demonstrate for example increasing authoritarian ag-
gressions against Muslims, Sinti and Roma as well as against refugees and 
asylum seekers (Decker, Kiess and Bähler 2016, 48). In addition, they observe 
an increasing radicalisation and the readiness to use violence among Germans. 
Another survey on exclusive orientations throughout German society points 
out a radicalisation within the AfD (Klein and Müller 2016, 201). They also 
hint towards the fact that the political culture in Germany is dominated by 
radical currents today (Zick 2016, 211). 
Accordingly, 40% of the people asked shared the opinion that “society is be-
ing infiltrated by Muslims” (Küpper, Häusler and Zick 2016, 143, translation I. 
R.), which demonstrates how much influence the closed picture of the ‘Mus-
lim’ as a cultural-other has in German society. In addition, the “New Right” 
claim for a positive culture of remembrance receives great recognition among 
the Germans – with 40% of respondents of the opinion that, “We should have 
the courage to show a strong national sentiment again.” (Zick 2016, 211, trans-
lation I. R.) 
Even though the AfD is trying to establish a “bourgeois” picture of their par-
ty, a representative survey shows that they are a party with a lot of extreme 
right-wingers. The researchers of the survey were also able to show that there 
are strong right-wing attitudes among Pegida supporters (Decker, Kiess and 
Bähler 2016, 92-3). 
Right-wing extremism is analysed in respect to different dimensions. Some 
of them are of special interest to my hypothesis, since they show the re-
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orientation of a great number of German people towards the national state as 
the most important frame of reference and object of identification. 
According to this, another very important result for my argument is that 
chauvinism – characterised as a special bond to the national state – has in-
creased significantly compared to 2014 (Decker, Kiess and Bähler 2016, 32 f.). 
26.2% speak out for more enforcement of German interests in international 
relations (Decker, Kiess and Bähler 2016, 30-1). 
An overall result is that men seem to be much more receptive to extreme 
right ideas (Decker, Kiess and Bähler 2016, 38). The authors also recognise a 
shift in racist patterns. While the overall approval of right extremism has di-
minished throughout society, at the same time the devaluation of certain groups 
such as Muslims, Sinti and Roma as well as refugees has increased (Decker, 
Kiess and Bähler 2016, 48). 
Widespread is the mistrust of the state representatives in the whole of Ger-
many, with 34.8% believing the national politicians to be “puppets of the un-
derlying powers” (Decker, Kiess and Bähler 2016, 60). Likewise, there is scep-
ticism concerning the press: less than half of the interviewees distance 
themselves from the term “Lügenpresse” (Decker, Kiess and Bähler 216, 62) 
(“fake media”) which was chanted by Pegida- demonstrators. Decker and oth-
ers are convinced that since 2014 the Pegida movement had great influence on 
the political discourse in Germany (Decker, Kiess and Bähler 2016, 63). 
All of the depicted results share the commonality that they show an orienta-
tion (re-orientation) towards the national state and national interests, to the 
disadvantage of European integration, human rights, and refugee support. 
3.  Welcome Culture – Counter Movement of Solidarity 
In contrast to the right-wingers who try to re-nationalise identity and politics, 
another movement became prominent during the so-called “refugee crisis,” 
which calls for worldwide solidarity: the so-called “welcome-culture” (Blomert 
2017). Social scientists questioned people who showed civic engagement for 
refugees (Karakayali and Kleist 2015). 
In their survey, they could isolate some overall claims of the representatives 
of the welcome-culture: They demand worldwide solidarity, human rights, and 
equality. They illustrate this claim by the exclamation „No human is illegal,” 
also used by NGO’s like Pro Asyl. 
They mostly share the idea of a post-migrant society, which does not estab-
lish a hierarchy between core culture and minorities but encourages equitable 
participation for all. They claim “Unity in Diversity” (Münckler and Münckler 
2016, 188, translation I. R.). 
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The EFA Survey on the phenomenon of “welcome culture” found out that 
there are two sub-groups within this group, who reason their dedication to 
refugees and migrants with two main motives: 
The one sub-group – mostly students – name solidarity and social closeness 
as their main motive, while the other side, which is mostly represented by older 
people 50+, name “Christian merits” as their main motive for refugee-support 
(Karakayali and Kleist 2015, 32). 
Another result from a different survey is that the support of the “welcome 
culture” has overall diminished during the last years, from 36% (in 2013/14) to 
28.2% (in 2015/16) (Zick and Preuß 2016, 3). 
The preference of refugees who are similar in religion and culture, is an atti-
tude that seems to correlate with growing age within this group. Almost every 
one asked who agreed with this statement was older than 50 years old (Kara-
kayali and Kleist 2015, 32). 
According to this, one could also speculate that favour for certain ethnic or 
national characteristics is not only affected by class, educational and regional 
factors but also generational factors. The experience of equal interaction with 
foreigners or their children might be an inherent experience younger people 
share in contrast to elder generations. This certainly provides some interesting 
research questions for the future. The findings from the survey on the welcome 
culture (Karakayali and Kleist 2015) prompt the idea that younger people seem 
to be habitually more able to accept foreigners or migrants at eye level. The 
special cultural capital younger people share – such as foreign languages or 
digital networking – might also help explain the “feeling of closeness” (Kara-
kayali and Kleist 2015, 32) which they address in the survey. 
The Pulse of Europe movement also represents an international orientation, 
and can be perceived as a counter movement to the nationalistic agitations. As 
their interest, they formulate the goal “to make the idea of Europe visible and 
audible again” as well as the “preservation of a united Europe.”8 
4. Sociodemographic Features and Representation of 
Preferences 
The current figures from Table 1 are not precisely comparable, but give an idea 
of the composition of the opposing groups and their educational level. One 
aspect that becomes clear is the gender-differences. While women dominate the 
welcome culture, the right-wing movements are male dominated. Both groups 
have a certain number of academics among them while representatives of the 
welcome culture share the highest educational level. 
                                                             
8  <https://pulseofeurope.eu/pulse-of-europe/ueber-uns/>, Accessed November 15, 2017. 
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Table 1:  Dividing Lines 
 “Welcome-culture” (EFA) Right Attitudes 
Pegida (Vorländer 
2016) 
AfD 
(Mitte Studie Leipzig) 
Age 20-30=34%; 
60+ =2.5% 
30-60  Average Age 46.9 
Education 61.6% academic degree 33% academic degree 16.2% qualification for 
university entrance  
Labour 
market, 
wages 
69.2% satisfied with their 
wage 
only 2% unemployed, 
over-average income 
79% satisfied with their 
wage 
Gender female majority (72%)   male majority  male majority (64.2%) 
Milieu Students, Christians Without Confession 43% no confession, 
30.8% Catholic, 
22.7% Protestant 
 
It could be concluded that we find two groups in German society with some-
how contradictory positions in relation to the German identity and then towards 
dealing with migrants in the whole, and especially refugees. On the one hand 
the supporters of the welcome-culture and on the other hand the Pedgida-
demonstrators and the AfD supporters, which represent the shift to the right in 
German society. Zick and Küpper ascertained a polarisation of political orien-
tations throughout Germany (2016, 15 f.). 
Bruns, Glösel and Strobel (2016, 64-5), as well as Speit (2016, 319), emphasise 
that well-educated bourgeois milieus9 offer a great frame of reference to right 
ideas and thus play a leading part in the shift to the right, which took place in 
German society during the last years. Müller (2013) describes this as the “ero-
sion of the centre of society”; Wilhelm Heitmeyer, who has run a long-term 
survey on the phenomenon of “group-based-misanthropy” (translation I. R.) 
labels these developments “de-culturation of the bourgeoisie” (Speit 2016, 
325). 
Speit associates this “de-culturation” with the radicalisation of economic 
circumstances in a neoliberal way (Speit 2016, 325). He also offers criticism of 
scientific and public discourses – according to him, they tend to focus too much 
on the extreme right currents with National Socialist background, disregarding 
                                                             
9  The term “bourgeois” contains a lot of semantic contradictions (Marg 2014, 258). It can 
either be used for everyone who is a citizen of a national state or describe an economical 
and cultural current which is located between aristocratic currents or upper class, and 
working class (Kocka 2008, 3). The use of this term in this article complies with the latter 
understanding. Regarding the AfD, “bourgeois” is a self-description; they emphasise that a 
bourgeois-led national state is the only favourable institution instead of a European inte-
gration (Kellershohn 2016, 20). 
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reflexions on moderate right milieus. Thus, the relevance of right-wing citizens 
who share an unequal value ideology as part of their worldview, is hidden, 
which made the shift towards an ideology of unequal value between Germans 
and Muslims possible (Speit 2016, 322). 
The typical claim from right-wing bourgeois milieus “You must be allowed 
to say that”10 (Speit 2016, 318, translation I. R.), seems to be absurd since the 
expression of generalised prejudices about “the Muslim” or “the refugee” has 
become a normality in recent debates. The sociologist Harald Welzer refers to 
this process as “shifting baseline” that particularly occurs in times of great 
dynamics on the political level.11 The slight changes in the connotations of the 
discourse remain unconscious,  
because the messages, terms, concepts, and provocations alternate so wildly, 
that one hardly notices that what was unspeakable yesterday, is today already 
part of a seemingly normal political discourse. (Welzer 2017, 2) 
This can become dangerous for social solidarity:  
When misanthropic narratives and images of minorities are shared by the ma-
jority of a group, the prejudice shifts from ideology to social norm and be-
comes a shared reality of the group. (Zick 2016, 210, translation I. R.) 
5. The Attempt of an Explanation with the Help of 
Norbert Elias’s Theoretical Frame of Reference -
Concept of Social Habitus 
For Norbert Elias the term social habitus means that there are habits and ways 
of thinking, feeling, and acting, which are bound to the social group of an indi-
vidual (relative autonomy) and accordingly, that members of a group share 
together. The more complex a society is in its structure, the more layers of 
social habitus exist (Elias 2001, 183). The accelerated social differentiation 
during the last decades worldwide, but especially in industrialised countries, 
has led to several integrational problems within these societies (Hall 1994, 
210). 
Elias emphasises that even though in differentiated societies the social habi-
tus can have several layers, there is a special importance of the survival-unit 
one is living in, for one’s identity and habitual orientations:  
It depends on the number of interlocking planes in his society how many lay-
ers are interwoven in the social habitus of a person. Among them, a particular 
layer usually has a special prominence. It is the layer characteristic of a mem-
                                                             
10  “Das müsse man doch noch sagen dürfen” (Speit 2016, 318). 
11  For example the integration process of the European Union, growing international interde-
pendencies, big problems like climate change and others. 
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bership of a particular social survival group, for example, a tribe or state. (Eli-
as 2001, 183) 
5.1  Drag-Effect of Social Habitus 
In Elias’s terms, the drag effect of habitus occurs when there is an asynchrony 
of habitual structures of individuals and the power structures they live in (Elias 
2001, 167 and 281). 
These drag effects are very likely to occur when central power resources 
shift from one less complex survival unit to a more complex survivor unit. In 
our example, this has been happening within the integration process from au-
tonomous national states to the supranational European Union. “[…] in the 
course of such integration processes the individual first of all loses power op-
portunities in relation to society” (Elias 2001, 165, translation I. R.) – and 
accordingly in relation to European elites as it is perceived by Pegida (section 
2.2). In this situation people “[…] have virtually no chance of influencing 
events on the global plane of integration” (Elias 2001, 165), for example finan-
cial crises, climate change, power of rating agencies, or international elites.  
The diminishing influence of national decision-making is experienced by 
representatives of the New Right, but they do not perceive it as a result from 
worldwide interdependencies which have their dynamics separately from indi-
vidual acting, but blame politicians, migrants, and refugees for enforcing these 
developments. Politicians, migrants, and refugees receive the blame for global-
isation processes as concrete others. Although the ongoing integration of hu-
mankind is not steerable because it has its own dynamics, some people seem to 
be under the illusion that a withdrawal back to the level of the national state 
would be possible and that they could cut off supranational and international 
relationships and still succeed economically in a globalised world. A positiv-
istic and individualistic ideology, which seems to be prominent among right-
wingers, suggests that societies or even individuals can control and manage 
everything – for example, those integration processes12 – and fail to realise that 
there are dynamics which evolve out of worldwide interdependencies, and 
which cannot be affected much by one country or person.  
We may or may not welcome the increasing integration of mankind. What is 
quite certain is that to begin with it increases the impotence of the individual 
in relation to what is happening on the top level of Humanity. (Elias 2001, 
166, translation I. R.) 
To conclude, the ongoing globalisation (accompanied by new forms of com-
munication and new power-structures) is a great challenge to the social habitus 
of those people who do not profit (losing position in favour of others) from 
                                                             
12  For example, the idea that Merkel herself opened the borders in summer 2015 and thus is 
personally responsible for the refugee crisis. 
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these developments, and especially those who see their social capital in danger 
(loss of function), and observe the emergence of new forms of capital that are 
generally valued but are out of reach for them, such as foreign languages and 
new forms of digital work. 
This might explain the quite diverse composition of the New Right, which 
unites highly educated bourgeois milieus who see their status positions and 
capitals in danger as well as poorly qualified younger people who are, from the 
offset, overwhelmed by the requirements of a globalised knowledge society. 
They share the general precariousness of living conditions (Marg 2014, 234) in 
the form of short-term contracts and the requirement of lifelong learning with 
many other segments of the population. 
It is a learning process to act under new requirements. This process can be 
delayed, is very complex and painful in terms of identity (Elias 2001, 285) and 
can lead to drag-effects of habitus. 
The new and expanded ways to identify oneself now appear to us often as too 
diverse, too little permanent, and in its architecture and iconography too com-
plicated. (Kaschuba 2016, 138, translation I. R.) 
5.2  Scope of Identification 
The explanation of why the process of habitual adoption to new power-
balances is so painful and hard is connected to another phenomenon described 
by Norbert Elias. The “We-Identity” which is central to the social habitus and 
is bound to the survival-group an individual lives in (Elias 2001, 168). 
On the European continent, the survival-unit national state has been central 
for at least two hundred years. The German integration process has been de-
scribed historically as late and problematic (compared to other European coun-
tries) and ended in favour of a militaristic habitus (Elias 2005, 77) which can 
still be seen as part of the “national character” (Elias 2005, 94). 
The re-orientation of these currents of German habitus is pushed by right in-
tellectuals, who exploit uncertainty of some people to address their exclusive 
perception of German identity. 
The polarisation of political orientations throughout German society is obvi-
ous: Some parts of German society, represented by the welcome-culture and 
Pulse of Europe, share a wide scope of identification, which has the whole 
world as their frame of reference (welcome culture), or the European Union 
(Pulse of Europe). While in other parts of German society, the “scope of identi-
fication” is bound to the national state as their dominant frame of reference 
(Pegida, AfD, die Identitären, “New Right”). This re-orientation gets pushed 
by right intellectuals who interrelate the feeling of depravation with myths 
about German identity and racial homogeneity, and address the wish for a 
“conservative revolution” (Bruns, Glösel and Strobel 2016, 40 ff.). 
“While some are looking ahead, the others orient themselves backwards” 
(Zick 2016, 214, translation I. R.). 
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5.3  Logic of Emotions 
How can we explain the rigidity and the exclusive orientations of an intellectu-
al class in Germany, which does not suffer from a lack of material resources or 
education? In their book “The Established and the Outsiders” Elias and John L. 
Scotson give a hint to the fact that when bare necessities are gratified, the com-
petition between groups shifts from material resources as the most important 
goods, to prestige, pride, status, and interpretational sovereignty as the most 
important “goods” (Elias and Scotson 1993, 309-10). This is what happens 
with parts of the German bourgeoisie; they see their “ideology of unequal val-
ue” (Speit 2016, 322) in danger and experience new power-balances in favour 
of minorities as a great assault on their beliefs and their image of the world. 
The mechanics of stigmatisation cannot easily be understood without a closer 
look at the part played by a person’s image of his group’s standing among 
others and, therefore, of his own standing as a member of his group. (Elias 
2001, 9, translation I. R.) 
This can also explain why their reaction to representatives of the welcome-
culture are just as rigid as against minorities – they contemptuously call them 
“Good-Humans” (Gutmenschen). People with a wider scope of identification 
appear to them as traitors who endanger the cohesion of their national group 
(Elias and Scotson 1993, 12). 
As in other cases the logic of emotions is stringent: power superiority is 
equated with human merit, human merit with special grace of nature or gods. 
The gratification received through one’s share in the group charisma makes up 
for the personal sacrifice of gratification in the form of submission to group 
norm. (Elias and Scotson 1993, 18, translation I. R.)  
New power balances in favour of minorities endanger this feeling of superiori-
ty. “The strengthening of local identities can be counted as a severe defence 
reaction of the members of a ruling ethnic group, which feels in danger because 
of the presence of other cultures” (Hall 1994, 217). As an example Hall refers 
to a British discourse about the essence of being English. The German dis-
course about core culture can be assessed similarly. Another part of the expla-
nation refers to the shaping of the German bourgeois habitus itself. 
6.  Bourgeois Self-Image and Habitus 
The interconnectedness of parts of the bourgeois milieus and the New Right 
movements, has been refused especially by bourgeois milieus themselves 
(AfD) in popular discourse, by claiming they could not be addressed as right-
wingers, since they were bourgeois (Speit 2016, 319). They experience them-
selves as representatives of humanistic bourgeois merits and morally on the 
right side even though they show exclusive orientations in certain currents. 
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In his “Studies on the Germans,” Norbert Elias reveals that the special his-
toric development of Germany, which, compared to other European national 
states, was late and inchoate in its integration (Elias 2005, 77 f.), led to a situa-
tion where the bourgeois milieus adopted the standards of behaviour and feel-
ing of the dominant aristocratic currents. Those were orientated towards a 
“Kriegerkanon” (“Canon of warriors”) (Elias 2005, 95) which evolved out of 
centuries of struggle and wars and contained the following ideas of “right of 
the strongest,” “preserving inequality between people,” “hardness of life” (Eli-
as 2005, 93). 
Hence, the German bourgeois milieus and their standards of behaviour and 
feeling were not only shaped by humanistic ideas and the enlightenment, as is 
emphasised in popular discourses, but also by this authoritarian “Kriegerka-
non.” According to Elias, this canon had massive influence on the German 
“national character” (Elias 2005, 98) which means “the specific German tradi-
tion of behaviour and feeling” (Elias 2005, 98). This makes the reactivation of 
exclusive tendencies among these milieus possible, sharing the “Conservative 
Revolution” as a frame of reference (Bruns, Glösel and Strobel 2016, 40). 
Representatives of the Conservative Revolution conceive themselves as a coun-
ter movement to the 1968-movement, which was represented by more liberal 
and egalitarian currents of the bourgeois. Within the shift to the right in Ger-
many, “[t]he bourgeois are not merely passively agitated, but share a radically 
anti-egalitarian concept of democracy with the right-wing extremism.” (Bruns, 
Glösel and Strobel 2016, 31, translation I. R.). 
Another important aspect concerning the establishment of exclusive tenden-
cies within the German society is the focus on performance and achievement 
which includes the evaluation of people in the categories “useful” and “use-
less” (Sommer 2010, 270). This can function as a bridge to other forms of 
exclusive tendencies towards minorities. 
Especially the “self-optimizing norm” as a facet of “market-shaped extrem-
ism” could be perceived as a strong connection to milieus of the middle, “open-
ing up the doors for devaluation and exclusion with the argument of lack of 
usefulness and inefficiency.” (Speit 2016, 327, translation I. R.). 
Sommer refers to Rommelsbacher, who describes right extremism not as a 
deviation from normality, but as the most radical form and politicised expres-
sion of a “dominance-culture” – tendencies of an ideology of unequal-
significance was found throughout society in weaker forms (Sommer 2010, 
270).  
7.  Reflections 
The recent power shifts from national state to the European Union and the 
power shifts from national institutions to multinational institutions and compa-
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nies, financial industry, and other world regions express an assault on the social 
habitus of certain groups, from young people with little education, to highly 
educated bourgeois milieus. 
Thus the New Right follow the illusion that it would be possible to take back 
global interdependencies and go back to single national states as the highest 
level of integration, as survival units – a desperate attempt to adjust the actual 
circumstances to their nationalistic worldview. 
The bourgeois habitus in its humanistic and egalitarian currents is still 
strong within German society as the support for the welcome culture clearly 
shows – “half of the people asked share positive emotions due to the fact that 
Germany has accommodated so many refugees” (Zick 2016, 213). Others who 
feel fear when considering the newcomers but see ways of solving the alleged 
problems do not behave as aggressively (ibid.). 
Against the common thesis that the bourgeois and extreme right are antago-
nistic (Vorländer, Herold and Schäller 2016), it seems that the bourgeois habi-
tus can also be the foundation for exclusive attitudes, as in some currents it 
contains the notion of a hierarchy of value between people. These authoritarian 
currents of the bourgeois milieus devaluate humanistic ideas and aim for a 
legitimisation of totalitarianism (Speit 2016, 323). 
Dörre, Kraemer and Speidel assess a “crisis of political representation” 
(2006, 124) in Germany. According to this, the political decisions of the Euro-
pean Union are regarded as nontransparent, unjust, and undemocratic by many 
people. In the face of that, the well-known national borders appear even more 
attractive. 
Overall, there are fears of unforeseen global crises, uncontrollability of in-
ternational markets and environmental risks. Actions and options from national 
governments are becoming more and more incomprehensible for the popula-
tion. Subjective experience or real security loss on the one hand, and identity 
loss on the other hand can be the consequence and lead to aggressive closing 
processes. 
Why does this affect only a part of the population while the other, converse-
ly, sees increasing global integration as positive and expresses its solidarity 
with both the European neighbours and refugees? The question of why respec-
tive individuals feel addressed by one side or the other, is an aspect for further 
research. Zick points out that people who are afraid of new developments and 
newcomers, but still see ways of solving problems which might occur out of 
these processes, are less likely to become aggressive (2016, 214). 
That is why he sees it as an important challenge to make people perceive so-
lutions for new kinds of problems and encourage them to participate in solving 
them (Zick 2016, 214), instead of joining the panicmongering of the New 
Right.  
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The transformation of fear into rejection can be attributed to a loss of trust in 
the ability to control national institutions, missing information, or successful 
propaganda about a refugee crisis. (Zick 2016, 215, translation I. R.) 
Politicians and journalists should therefore not take part in heating up the mis-
trust within society, but maintain a distanced perspective on real problems. 
Noticeable is that especially the conservative CDU/CSU is involved in these 
identity-struggles as for example the attempt to establish norms for a core cul-
ture by Thomas de Mazière shows. 
Overall, we find a conglomerate of motives and dynamics, which explain 
the pronounced occurrence of the drag-effects of social habitus among the New 
Right. This has already led to a shift to the right during the so-called ‘refugee 
crisis.’ At the same time a large part of German society already shows a wider 
scope of identification and does not compensate its fears with aggressive, ex-
clusive tendencies. Following Zick (2016) – the most important aspects to 
achieve non-aggressive orientation processes are transparency about political 
processes. This also concerns aspects of loss of power within global integration 
processes described by Elias (2001), and the demonstration of solutions for 
future challenges. Democratic processes must be applied transparently to the 
new institutional level of integration. This has not really taken place within the 
European Union and has probably fuelled the mistrust regarding the European 
Union and processes of globalization within German society. 
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